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 The Duration and Outcome of Unemployment Spells
– The Role of Economic Incentives
By Knut Røed and Tao Zhang*
Abstract
We investigate how transitions from unemployment are affected by economic incen-
tives and spell duration. Based on unique Norwegian register data that exhibit the rar-
ity of random-assignment-like variation in economic incentives, the causal parameters
are identified without reliance on distributional assumptions or functional form re-
strictions. We find that the hazard rates are negatively affected by the replacement
ratio, but that the size of these effects varies considerably among individuals. There is
strong negative duration dependence in the employment hazard and positive duration
dependence in the ‘discouragement’ hazard. The employment hazard rises substan-
tially in the months just prior to benefit exhaustion.
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21 Introduction
The aims of this paper are first, to uncover the extent to which the level and the dura-
tion unemployment benefits affect individual transition probabilities out of unem-
ployment, and second, to identify the shape of structural (genuine) duration depend-
ence governing these transitions. In order to fulfil these aims, we have to overcome
one of most fundamental problems in virtually all microeconometric applications: the
isolation of causal effects from selection mechanisms related to unobserved heteroge-
neity. In our case, there are two types of unobserved factors that may corrupt our at-
tempts to identify causality. The first is unobserved characteristics that are related to
the economic incentive variables for which causal effects are to be identified. In our
case, this kind of relationship arises because eligibility to, as well as the level of un-
employment benefits typically depend on past labour market behaviour, which again
may have been affected by unobserved personal characteristic that also affect the haz-
ard rates in question directly. The second source of distortion is unobserved heteroge-
neity that at the moment of inflow to the unemployment pool is unrelated to the ex-
planatory variables of interest, but nevertheless produce a sorting effect as the spells
proceed. This sorting effect is well known to produce a transition rate pattern over
spell duration that is far from causal, and also to inject a duration-specific dependence
between unobserved heterogeneity and explanatory variables.
Although there is by now a vast and advanced unemployment duration litera-
ture addressing benefit compensation- as well as spell duration effects1 (see e.g.
                                                
1 Important contributions to this literature include Lancaster (1979), Moffitt (1985), Narendrana-
than et al  (1985), Katz and Meyer (1990), Meyer (1990) and Card and Levine (2000).
3Devine and Kiefer, 1991, or Pedersen and Westergård-Nielsen, 1998, for recent sur-
veys), the issue of causality remains basically unsettled. The reason for this is that
virtually all the proposed sources of identification are encumbered with disturbing
question marks. The most promising attempts to identify causal effects associated
with unemployment benefits are probably those built on the difference-in-difference
methodology, in which identification is based on policy reforms that affect some, but
not all unemployed (Meyer, 1989; Hunt, 1995; Winter-Ebmer, 1998; Carling et al,
2001). But even these papers have had to rely on the sometimes questionable (and
untestable) assumption that labour market opportunities do not develop differently for
the ‘treatment’ and the ‘control’ groups.  The issue of identifying spell duration ef-
fects has been subject to huge progress during the past few years, particularly on the
theoretical front (see van den Berg, 2001, for a recent survey), but most identification
results still hinge on functional form assumptions such as mixed proportionality
(MPH). Moreover, applications typically rest on additional and much more restrictive
functional form assumptions, which are imposed for practical- or computational rea-
sons.
In this paper we identify the causal effects of interest in a purely data-based
fashion, with a minimum of parametric assumptions. For this purpose, we take ad-
vantage of a unique Norwegian database (the Frisch Database), which describes the
main labour market activity for the Norwegian adult population by the end of each
month during the period from 1992 to 1997. In order to identify the causal effect of
unemployment benefits, we have searched through the benefit system and its recent
history in order to disclose administrative procedures and/or events that may contain
elements of ‘random-assignment-like’ variation in unemployment benefits. And what
we have found is that the bureaucracy indeed produces differences in benefit out-
4comes that are arbitrary (many would say unfair) from the viewpoint of the individu-
als. For example, for reasons of verifiability, benefits are calculated on the basis of
labour income recorded in the previous calendar year, implying that a given income
entails higher benefits the more it is concentrated within the last calendar year. Rules
like this have a purely administrative motivation with no behavioural justification, and
in some cases they yield peculiar results. And although this type of variation is of mi-
nor importance for most people, the sheer size of the data we use ensures that it is suf-
ficient for investigating not only average disincentive effects, but also the extent to
which these effects interact with business cycles, spell duration, age and individual
economic resources. The pattern of structural (individual level) duration dependence
is identified non-parametrically without reliance on any arbitrary parametric assump-
tions. Our main basis for identification is the presence of multiple inflow cohorts,
which at any duration above zero entails a substantial variation in lagged hazard rates,
conditional on the current search environment. The intuition behind this source of
identification is as follows: The lagged variation in hazard rates ensures that otherwise
similar persons have been subject to different hazard rates earlier in their spell. And
persons who according to observed characteristics (including business- and seasonal
cycles) have had a high probability of making a particular transition without doing so,
will on average have ‘poorer’ unobserved characteristics regarding that particular
transition than persons who according to the observed information in any case have
had a low probability of making that trans ition.
The present paper builds on previous work described in Røed and Zhang
(2003), in which we analysed the effects of unemployment compensation on unem-
ployment duration for a relatively homogenous group of unemployed (with previous
incomes ranging from around 25,000 to 33,000 Euro) for which the variation in bene-
5fits (conditioned on previous income) was fully explained by a random-assignment-
like process. We found that the average elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to
unemployment compensation within this group was around –0.7, and that the behav-
ioural responses towards unemployment compensation were relatively stable over the
business cycle and over the spell duration. In the present paper, we instead seek to
isolate the random-assignment type variation for unemployed workers in all income
classes by a particular form of decomposition of the replacement ratio (unemployment
benefits divided by the expected wage). This decomposition has the interesting prop-
erty that the resulting random-assignment type component in the replacement ratio,
which we use to identify causal effects, is correctly measured even when expected
wages are incorrectly measured. Furthermore, we extend the single risk approach
adopted in Røed and Zhang (2003) into a competing risks framework in which there
are four possible exits out of insured unemployment spells; i) an ordinary job; ii) long
term sickness or temporary/permanent disability (discouragement); iii) loss of benefits
(due to exhaustion or sanctions); and iv) participation in labour market programs. The
next section gives a brief outline of the theoretical background. Section 3 presents the
data with a particular focus on the sources of independent (random) variation in the
replacement ratio and the decomposition method used to isolate this variation. Section
4 presents the econometric model, including our treatment of unobserved heterogene-
ity. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 summarises the main conclusion.
2 The Theoretical Background
Dynamic search theory (Mortensen, 1977; 1990; van den Berg, 1990a) suggests that a
higher level of unemployment benefits, conditioned on the expected wage, normally
entails reduced job search effort, increased job selectivity (reservation wage), and
hence a reduced probability of making a transition from unemployment to employ-
6ment. Moreover, there is positive structural duration dependence in the job transition
hazard, since search effort increases- and the reservation wage decreases as the mo-
ment of benefit exhaustion comes closer.
A number of economic mechanisms has been identified in the literature that
may complicate the relationship between marginal changes in the benefit level and the
job search behaviour. First, the arrival rate of job offers not only depends on individ-
ual search effort, but also on the tightness of the labour market. This implies that the
relative influence of the supply constraint (the reservation wage) and the demand con-
straint (the number of job offers) may differ over the business cycle, such that disin-
centive effects associated with the benefit level are stronger in good times than in bad
times (Moffitt, 1985; Arulampalam and Stewart, 1995). Second, since the discounted
value of future potential benefits declines over spell duration, it is possible that mar-
ginal changes in the benefit level has a larger behavioural effect the shorter is the un-
employment spell. In addition, long term unemployed may have reduced their reser-
vation sufficiently to make a marginal change in benefits virtually irrelevant (Naren-
dranathan and Stewart, 1993). On the other hand, the presence of liquidity constraints
may imply that economic incentives in general become more important as the unem-
ployment spell is prolonged. Third, persons facing tight wage distributions are likely
to exhibit larger benefit responses than persons facing wide wage distributions, since
the effect of a rise in the reservation wage will have a larger impact on the job rejec-
tion rate the tighter is the wage distribution (Narendranathan et al, 1985). Since young
workers typically face tighter wage distributions than older workers, this may imply
that marginal disincentive effects are relatively stronger for younger workers. Fourth,
disincentive effects may depend on marital status and the economic resources of the
household. A sound family economy (with no immediate liquidity constraints) may
7entail a low sensitivity towards marginal changes in the benefit level. But even the
other extreme (economic hardship) may imply low sensitivity towards marginal
changes, since the benefit level in any case may be considered utterly insufficient.
The issue of duration dependence is also complicated by factors that are not
directly related to benefit exhaustion. First, there may be discouragement effects, im-
plying that the effective level of job search declines as the unemployment spell is
prolonged (Layard et al, 1991; Vendrik, 1993; Røed et al, 1999). Second, the level of
transferable skills may depreciate during longer unemployment spells (Pissarides,
1992), implying that the expected wage also declines and that the replacement ratio
increases. Third, since the average (unobserved) ‘quality’ of the workers declines as a
function of spell duration, employers may use the length of the unemployment spell as
a tool for statistical discrimination (Blanchard and Diamond, 1994). All these mecha-
nisms tend to produce negative structural duration dependence in the job hazard rate.
At the same time, they probably contribute to positive duration dependence in the
probability of leaving the labour force due to discouragement through periods of sick-
ness/disability.
The extent to which unemployment benefits affect the escape rate to non-
participation states such as sickness and disability depends of course on the exact way
in which benefits are calculated in these alternative states. In Norway, sickness bene-
fits for unemployed persons are exactly equal to their unemployment benefits; hence
unemployed persons have apparently no pecuniary incentives to record themselves as
‘sick’ rather than ‘unemployed’. However, disability rehabilitation programs may of-
ten entail higher benefits, and these programs are typically preceded by a period of
sickness. It is therefore possible that some unemployed workers with particularly poor
employment prospects and/or low unemployment benefits may consider a path of
8sickness, disability and subsequent rehabilitation (or permanent disability) more eco-
nomically promising than continued job search. Labour market programs also typ i-
cally involve continuation of the existing benefit level, although some forms of relief
work entail higher benefits.
The relationship between economic incentives and search behaviour is further
complicated by the existence of work tests. Refusal to take part in consultations at the
employment office, refusal to accept offers of regular (but perhaps poorly paid) jobs
or to participate in labour market programs, may imply that benefits are terminated.
These threats are of course more important the higher are the benefits that can be for-
feited. But the Public Employment Service may have orders to exert a stronger pres-
sure on some unemployed – for example youths and long term unemployed – than on
others.
We do not attempt to combine all these mechanisms into a coherent theoretical
model, as such a model quickly would become intractable. Instead, we seek to con-
struct a flexible transition rate model that is able to test the various hypotheses in the
form of reliable causal reduced form parameters. To the extent that the qualitative and
quantitative importance of the different causal mechanisms can be uncovered, this can
subsequently contribute to a further development of the theoretical literature.
3 The Data and the Sources of Conditionally Independent Variation
in the Replacement Ratio
The Norwegian unemployment insurance system is compulsory, and the benefit is
calculated as 62.4 per cent of labour earnings the previous calendar year (or the aver-
age of the last three years if this average is higher than last years income), up to a
ceiling of roughly 33,000 Euro. Apparently, this implies that there is no variation in
9benefits, conditional on previous wages. However, there are two features of the Nor-
wegian benefit system that in fact do entail some degree of conditionally independent
variation. The first source of variation applies only to persons with less than two years
continues work-experience just prior to the unemployment spell: Since benefit ent i-
tlements are calculated on the basis of income earned in the previous calendar year, a
given income in a given period just prior to the unemployment spell gives a higher
benefit the more it is concentrated within the last calendar year. This is of course a
purely administrative procedure with no behavioural justification, and it produces a
variation in benefits which is similar to the way the tax level depends on the extent to
which a given income is spread out on different tax years. The second source of
variation is provided by indexation rules and applies to all unemployed: If benefits are
granted during May-December, the base income (from the year before) is indexed ac-
cording to the adjustment factor applying to the pension system before benefits are
calculated. The same indexation is not implemented for spells starting in January-
April. Moreover, indexation is not implemented for ongoing spells. These procedures
imply that benefits are slightly higher for workers who become unemployed after 1
May than for workers becoming unemployed before that date and that, relative to any
sensible measure of expected wages, the benefit level for ongoing spells is reduced in
connection with the yearly wage settlements.
From a theoretical point of view, it is indeed the benefit level relative to the
expected wage (or more general; the benefit level, conditioned on the expected wage)
that affects the transition rate to a job; see e.g. Mortensen (1990). The expected wage
is intrinsically unobserved, and depends of course on observed as well as unobserved
individual characteristics. In order to purify our source of independent variation, we
decompose the unobserved replacement ratio, i.e. the benefit level divided by the ex-
10
pected income, into one factor that is dependent- and one that is independent of ind i-
vidual characteristics, conditional on work experience.  Let the replacement ratio for
an individual i at time t be denoted rit. Let *ir  denote the replacement ratio that ind i-
vidual i would have obtained in a stationary environment (without wage growth) had
he been continuously employed in the past calendar year, and let ait be the adjustment
factor related to insufficient work experience in the past calendar year and to general
wage- and benefit growth, such that * .it i itr r a=  We then have
that , 1* *
min( , )
0.624 ,ii
i
y y
r
y
-=  where yi,-1 is income in the previous calendar year (the
year before the start of the unemployment spell), y is the threshold income in the
benefit system, and *iy is the expected income. Let ei be the fraction of the last calen-
dar year in which person i was employed. Let bt be the adjustment factor used to in-
dex benefits granted after the 1 of May and let gt be the growth rate in aggregate
wages (on a yearly basis), also taking place from the 1 of May. Assume that each per-
son’s expected wage grows in line with the aggregate wage rate (conditional on spell
duration). We then have that the adjustment factor ait in the first month of the unem-
ployment spell is determined as  it ia e= if the spell started in January-April and
(1 )
1
i t
it
t
e b
a
g
+
=
+
 if the spell started in May-December. In the subsequent duration
months it is only changes in expected wages (related to new tariff agreements) that
can change the replacement ratio, such that 1it ita a -=  for all calendar months except
May and 1
1
it
it
t
a
a
g
-=
+
 in May.
Benefits can be maintained for up to 156 weeks in Norway. But until January
1997, there was a formal limitation of 80 weeks, followed by a 13-week cut-off pe-
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riod, after which a new 80+13-week period could start at a somewhat reduced benefit
level. In practice, an exemption rule implied that benefits were rarely withdrawn dur-
ing the cut-off period. Persons without benefits, e.g. because entitlements are ex-
hausted, are entitled to means-tested social security support.
The data we use in the present analysis is obtained by merging a number of
administrative registers. In principal, it gives an account of the main labour market
activity for the whole Norwegian adult population by the end of each month during
the period from 1992 to 1997. However, for the purpose of conducting the analysis in
the present paper, we have restricted the survey population to new unemployment
spells that satisfy a number of conditions. First, in order to be sure that the previous
income is not affected by previous spells of unemployment, we condition on at least
24 months of absence from the unemployment register prior to a new spell. Second,
we require at least two months of paid work prior to the unemployment spell in order
to make sure that the monthly income (and the benefit level) is identified. Third, we
restrict attention to persons that were involuntary unemployed (i.e. they did not quit
their previous job voluntarily) and hence were entitled to benefits from the start of the
unemployment spell. Fourth, we concentrate on persons with benefits calculated on
the basis of last years income (implying that we exclude persons for which the aver-
age of the last three years income is higher than last years income). And finally, we
limit the population to persons aged 20-59 years.
We track the unemployment benefit spells month by month until they are ter-
minated with a job, with a withdrawal from the labour force in the form of sickness or
disability, with loss of benefits, with participation in a labour market program, or cen-
sored. Censoring occurs when persons become 60 years of age, when spell duration
exceeds three years, and at the end of the observation period.
12
We use a number of control variables to minimise the problem of unobserved
heterogeneity. These controls include standard demographic variables, such as gen-
der, age, county of residence, family situation, and nationality, as well as human
capital variables such as educational attainment and years of work-experience. We
also include controls for the month of entry into unemployment (12 seasonal dum-
mies) and the extent of work-experience in the year just prior to the unemployment
spell (12 dummies). The reason for this is that the presumed independent part of the
replacement ratio, ait, is strongly affected by the calendar month of entry as well as
the extent of work in the past 12 months, and these variables may again be related to
unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. in the form of a seasonal pattern in the ‘quality’ of in-
flow cohorts); hence the independence assumption is only credible conditioned on
these variables. In order to improve upon the characterisation of individuals’ human
capital, we take advantage of income records (based on pension point accumulation)
for the years back to 1967. The basic idea is that the ranking of individual abilities,
conditioned on education and work-experience, is revealed through the actual income
path (Røed and Nordberg, 2002). We use the following procedure to proxy the level
of human capital embedded in individual ability: We first divide the whole Norwegian
population into 120 relatively homogenous groups with respect to gender, educational
attainment and work experience, and retrieve for each person the maximum yearly
income earned after the education was completed (adjusted for aggregate wage
growth). We then compute a set of dummy variables indicating the decile in the
within-group maximum earnings distribution to which each person belongs. In order
to avoid arbitrary functional form relationships, we use these dummies directly in the
econometric models explaining labour market transitions.
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Some descriptive statistics of the data-set is provided in Table 1. There are
44,816 spells that satisfy our data selection criteria. Only 169 of them are repeat
spells. The low number of repeat spells results directly from our requirement of ab-
sence from the unemployment register for at least two years in order to be counted as
a ‘new’ unemployed.
Table 1
Selected Descriptive Statistics
Period* 1992 (1993) -1997
Number of individuals 44,647
Number of spells 44,816
Number of monthly observations 281,834
Per cent of spells ending in
Transition to a job 40.40
Transition to a sickness or disability 9.31
Termination of benefits 14.99
Transition to a labour market program 9.06
Censored 26.24
Mean replacement ratio taken over observations
(Standard Deviation)
itr 0.51 (0.15)
*
i
r 0.59 (0.08)
ita 0.86 (0.22)
Per cent with less than 12 months work experience in the past calendar year 32.59
Other selected means and fractions (per cent) taken over observations
Men (per cent) 43.34
Married (per cent) 42.35
Family wealth>0 (per cent) 17.31
Dependent children (per cent) 38.50
Educational attainment (per cent)
Only compulsory education 21.00
Lower secondary education 26.61
Upper secondary education 35.56
Lower university degree 14.17
Higher university degree 2.66
Work experience (years) 9.95
Immigrants from Non OECD countries (per cent) 5.20
* Since we use lagged information on work-experience the past 12 months as explanatory variables,
only data from 1993 is used in the actual estimation.
4 The Econometric Model
We estimate a competing risks transition rate model with four competing destination
states. Time has two dimensions in our analysis; calendar time t, and process time
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(spell duration) d. Let k=1,...,4 be the four alternative destination states of employ-
ment, sickness/disability, benefit termination and program participation, respectively.
Let i be the subscript over individuals. The four hazard rates are then defined as
 ( ) , ,, .limik
d 0
P(d D d + d , K = k | D d i t)
t d =
d
q
D ®
£ £ D ³
D
 (1)
As we observe labour market status by the end of each month only, we set up the
econometric model in terms of discrete (grouped) hazard rates (Prentice and Gloeck-
ler, 1978; Meyer, 1990; Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993). Let ti be the calendar
time at which individual i entered the state of unemployment. The grouped composite
hazard, i.e. the probability of exiting to one of the four states during duration month d,
given that no exit occurred before that, is given as
1
1 exp ( , )
d
id ik i
k d
h t u u duq
-
æ ö
= - - +ç ÷
è ø
å ò . (2)
We assume for simplicity that the hazard rates are constant within each calendar
month. Let xit be a vector of observed control variables and let vik be scalar measures
of unobserved heterogeneity affecting the hazard rate to state k. Let kts  measure the
calendar time effects, and let kdl  measure the spell duration effects. Imposing expo-
nential link functions between individual characteristics and the hazard rates, we have
that
1
( , ) exp( log( ) ' ).
d
ik i ik it it k kt kd ik
d
t u u du r x vq g b s l
-
+ = + + + +ò (3)
Taken at face value, the parameter ikg is the elasticity of individual i’s hazard rate to
transition k with respect the replacement ratio. But if the benefit level and the ex-
pected income in a job affect the hazard rate with coefficients that are not equal in ab-
solute terms, ikg  may in fact be given a more general interpretation as the elasticity
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with respect to the level of unemployment benefits. To see this, assume that the level
of expected income affects the hazard rate with the elasticity ikj , such that the term
log( )ik itrg  in (3) is replaced by log(benefits) log(expected income)ik ikg j- . This ex-
pression can then be reorganised into log( ) ( )log(expected income)ik it ik ikrg j g- - ,
hence the formulation in (3) appears to require the restriction that ik ikj g= . However,
in our case, we may interpret a number of our control variables (such as previous in-
come, educational attainment, position in skill-specific wage income distribution, and
work experience) as instruments for the intrinsically unobserved level of expected in-
come. What remains to be explained is how we can calculate the replacement ratio
itself without observations on expected income. Now, according to the decomposition
discussed in the previous section, we have that the replacement ratio can be factorised
into the two terms *ir and ita , reflecting individual factors and ‘random assignment’
factors respectively. The individual factor, *ir , cannot be calculated without making
an assumption about the level of the expected wage, and for simplicity we assume that
the expected income is equal to the last years income2, i.e. * , 1i iy y -= . The random as-
signment factor, however, is independent of the expected wage. Hence, we may use
the factorisation of the replacement ratio to obtain two sets of parameter estimates for
the same coefficients *( (log ) log( ) log( ))ik it ik i ik itr r ag g g= + , one that is known to be
consistent, and one that may be inconsistent due to correlation with unobservables or
to systematic errors in the prediction of expected wages.
                                                
2 This implies that if the true expected wage declines, and hence the replacement ratio rises, as a
function of spell duration (see e.g. Gregory and Jukes, 2001, for some evidence indicating that this may
be the case), this effect will in our case show up in the estimated spell duration baseline.
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In this paper, we wish to identify the ‘average’ disincentive effects, as well as
the degree to which these effects vary with demographic factors and economic cir-
cumstances. Hence, we assume that each elasticity ikg depends on a vector of ob-
served covariates zit, such that 'ik itzg a= . In line with the our theoretical considera-
tions in Section 2, the variables included in zit are spell duration, business cycle con-
dition3, age, gender, wealth4, marital status and income of the spouse. While the roles
of the replacement ratio and the respective interaction terms are relatively straight-
forward in the employment hazard, these variables have a more vague role to play in
the other hazard rates. But, in the absence of better predictors for the economic incen-
tives associated with the various non-employment states, we apply the same incentive
variables in all trans itions.
We now turn to the estimation of the model, based on observations of ex-
planatory variables and transitions. In order to avoid unnecessary parametric restric-
tions, we assume that the unobserved variables vik are discretely distributed (Lindsay,
1983), with the number of mass-points chosen by adding points until it is no longer
possible to increase the likelihood function (Heckman and Singer, 1984). Let Bi be the
number of unemployment spells experienced by individual i during the observation
period.  Let yibk be binary indicator variables denoting transitions to the four alterna-
tive destinations states, i.e. yibk=1 if individual i transited to state k in spell b, and zero
otherwise. The contribution to the likelihood function from a spell starting at time ibt
                                                
3 We use a monthly business cycle indicator provided by Røed and Zhang (2003). This indicator
reflects the aggregate monthly flow from unemployment to employment, corrected for selection effects
due to observed heterogeneity and spell duration.
4 Only taxable wealth is measured in the registers, implying that most persons are recorded with
zero wealth. For this reason we represent wealth by a dummy variable indicating that family wealth is
strictly positive.
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and lasting dib months, conditional on a particular vector of unobserved heterogeneity
1 2 3 4( , , , ),l l l l lv v v v v=  may then be written:
( )( )
( )
1
( , , , )
| 1 exp ( , , , )
( , , , )
exp ( , , , ))
ib ibkk
k ib ib it lk
ib l k ib ib it lkk
k k ib ib it lkk
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t d x v
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t d x v
j
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j
j
-
=
é ù
= - -ê ú
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é ù´ -ë û
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(4)
where ( )*( , , , ) exp ' log( ) ' log( ) 'k ib ib it lk k it i k it it it k kt kd lkt d x v z r z a x vj a a b s l= + + + + + .
We assume that the four unobserved variables are discretely distributed with W points
of support, and estimate these mass points together with their associated probabilities.
In terms of observed variables, the likelihood is then given as
1 11 1
| ,    1
iBN W W
l ib l l
l li b
L p L v p
= == =
= =å åÕ Õ  (5)
where pl is the probability of a particular combination of unobserved variables.
The data at hand provides a unique opportunity for disentangling the effects of
structural duration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity, without relying on par-
ticular distributional assumptions. One (minor) reason for this is that there are a few
repeat spells in the data (Honoré, 1993). However, a much more important and reli-
able source of identification is that there is large variation in lagged explanatory vari-
ables, conditioned on individuals’ current explanatory variables. Intuitively, this
source of identification rests on the idea that the conditional expectation of unob-
served heterogeneity depends on hazard rates experienced earlier in the spell, while
structural duration dependence does not (van den Berg and van Ours, 1994; 1996). In
the present case, variation in lagged hazard rates is primarily driven by variation in
calendar time itself, i.e. business- and seasonal cycles. Persons with the same spell
duration have been exposed to different business cycle conditions earlier in the spell;
hence they have been subject to different selection mechanisms. For example, a per-
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son who is still unemployed after d months of unemployment will clearly have a
lower expected value of vk the higher the probabilities of exiting to state k has been
earlier in the spell. Brinch (2000) provides a formal proof for the idea that variation in
covariates over time, combined with variation in covariates across individuals, is suf-
ficient for the identification of structural duration dependence in the presence of un-
observed heterogeneity, without parametric assumptions on either of these compo-
nents and even without the assumption of proportional hazards.
5 Estimation Results
The step-wise inclusion of mass-points ended up with five different types of unob-
served covariate vectors. Through this process, the log-likelihood function was im-
proved by around 100 units, from -128565.9 without unobserved heterogeneity to
–128469.2 for the preferred model.  From this point, we were not able to increase the
likelihood any further, neither through local grid searches nor through new and inde-
pendent estimations based on scrambled starting values. A total number of 680 pa-
rameters were estimated. The results that we present in this section are based on this
model5. Given the large number of estimated parameters, we do not spell out the
complete results (these are available on request). The plan of this section is as fo l-
lows: We first present estimates regarding structural duration dependence and the ef-
fects associated with benefit exhaustion. We then turn to the effects associated with
economic conditions in general and marginal changes in unemployment benefits in
                                                
5 Estimation of this model was a huge computational task, and, to our knowledge, a competing
risk model of this scale and flexibility has never before been estimated in practice. We could not have
done this without the support of Simen Gaure at the Computing Resource Centre at the University of
Oslo.
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particular. Finally, we present some results regarding the impact of observed- and un-
observed heterogeneity.
5.1 Duration Dependence and Benefit Exhaustion
Figure 1 presents the estimates of structural duration dependence in the four hazard
rates. The expected time of temporary benefit exhaustion is marked as an interval
(month 18-20) in the figure, since time aggregation prevents us from computing the
exact timing of this potential event for each individual. The job hazard rate displays a
clear pattern of negative duration dependence during the first year of unemployment.
Thus, throughout most of the spell it seems that the positive duration dependence im-
plied by limited benefit duration is more than compensated for by discouragement ef-
fects, declining human capital or statistical discrimination based on spell duration
(conf. Section 2). This pattern is turned upside down in the months just prior to bene-
fit exhaustion. The employment hazard rises by 50-100 per cent during the last three-
four entitlement months, indicating substantial, but rather myopic responses to the
prospect of benefit exhaustion. Our finding at this point is in line with previous results
reported in Røed and Zhang (2003), and suggests that even the very mild limitations
embedded in the Norwegian benefit system (with generous exemption rules) entail a
relatively strong ‘last-minute’-type behavioural response.
The interpretation of the generally declining employment hazard rate in terms
of a discouragement effect is supported by the estimated duration pattern in the prob-
ability of becoming sick or disabled. Although this pattern is imprecisely estimated
(as indicated by the large confidence intervals), there is strong evidence of positive
duration dependence. The lower bound of the 95 per cent confidence interval suggests
that the hazard rate is more than doubled during the first half year of unemployment.
The spell duration pattern in the benefit termination- and employment program hazard
20
rates mirrors administrative procedures. The benefit termination hazard rises monoto-
nously during the first benefit period, with a sharp increase when the benefit period is
exhausted. It then declines somewhat as a new benefit period begins. The labour mar-
ket program hazard also displays positive duration dependence, as these programs are
primarily aimed at long-term unemployed. Again, there is a relatively sharp increase
in the hazard rate around the time of benefit exhaustion.
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Figure 1. Estimated baseline hazard rates with 95 per cent (point-wise) confidence
intervals (calculated for a person with average replacement ratio)
Note: Verticle lines indicate the expected time of temporary benefit exhaustion. We suppress parts of
the upper confidence limits for expository reasons. Note also that the scales are not the same across the
four panels.
5.2 The Benefit Elasticity and individual economic conditions
As explained in Section 4, the model generates two sets of estimators for the same
sets of elasticity parameters, one based on the part of the replacement ratio that may
be correlated to unobserved individual characteristics *( )ir and one based on the ran-
dom-assignment-like variation ( )ita . We report the full set of parameter estimates for
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the estimates based on the random-assignment variation only, since these are the pa-
rameters considered to reflect causality. Part I of the table reports the elasticities esti-
mated for the ‘mean covariate vector’, while part II reports the estimated interaction
effects between the replacement ratio and other variables. Part III reports the average
predicted elasticities (taken over all observations in the dataset), and in order to illus-
trate the potential bias generated by the dependence between observed replacement
ratios and unobserved characteristics, we also report these summary statistics for the
predicted elasticities based on the non-independent variation *( )ir . Part IV reports
other parameter estimates reflecting effects of economic conditions.
Table 2
Effects of economic incentives
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Employ-
ment
Sickness/
disability
Loss of
benefits
Program
particip.
I. Benefit elasticity based on independent
variation (ait), reference group (unmarried
woman, no wealth, average age, average
business cycle and average spell duration)
-0.42**
(0.05)
-0.22*
(0.11)
-0.40**
(0.07)
0.39**
(0.11)
II. Interaction terms of replacement ratio ait
with business cycle -0.10
(0.20)
-0.68
(0.50)
0.69*
(0.35)
-0.63
(0.58)
with log duration -0.14**
(0.02)
0.05
(0.05)
-0.05
(0.04)
-0.11
(0.06)
with log age -0.25**
(0.10)
-0.91**
(0.23)
-0.07
(0.16)
0.52*
(0.23)
with dummy for male -0.00
(0.04)
0.33**
(0.13)
0.18**
(0.07)
-0.19
(0.11)
with dummy for (family) wealth>0 -0.11
(0.08)
-0.35*
(0.17)
-0.10
(0.12)
-0.33
(0.18)
with dummy for high income spouse 0.21**
(0.08)
-0.29*
(0.13)
0.06
(0.11)
-0.13
(0.16)
with dummy for low income spouse 0.16*
(0.08)
-0.17
(0.15)
-0-02
(0.11)
0.08
(0.17)
with dummy for no income spouse 0.24
(0.15)
-0.54*
(0.23)
-0.06
(0.20)
0.28
(0.37)
III. Average predicted benefit elasticity
taken over all observations [standard devia-
tion]
Based on independent variation  (ait) -0.43
[0.08]
-0.26
[0.19]
-0.40
[0.06]
0.40
[0.11]
Based on suspected non-independent
variation *( )
i
r
-0.00
[0.04]
0.94
[0.11]
0.31
[0.08]
0.05
[0.09]
IV. Level effects of having
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Table 2
Effects of economic incentives
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Employ-
ment
Sickness/
disability
Loss of
benefits
Program
particip.
family wealth>0 0.08**
(0.03)
-0.26**
(0.06)
-0.00
(0.04)
-0.02
(0.05)
high income spouse 0.17**
(0.03)
0.17**
(0.05)
-0.05
(0.04)
-0.14**
(0.05)
low income spouse 0.14**
(0.03)
0.34**
(0.06)
-0.03
(0.06)
-0.02
(0.05)
no income spouse 0.09
(0.05)
0.37**
(0.09)
-0.16*
(0.07)
-0.10
(0.09)
children (for women) -0.90**
(0.03)
-0.33**
(0.06)
-0.43**
(0.05)
-0.27**
(0.06)
children (for men) -0.28**
(0.03)
-0.08
(0.07)
-0.02
(0.05)
0.11*
(0.05)
*(**) significant at the 5(1) per cent level in a two-sided test.
The causal benefit elasticities are negative for the transitions to employment,
sickness/disability and loss of benefits. This is in line with prior expectations. The
employment hazard elasticity is on average around –0.4, which indicates slightly
weaker responses than previously reported by Røed and Zhang (2003). However,
there is substantial heterogeneity in individual elasticities, suggesting that average
elasticity estimates are likely to vary according to the composition of the population
under study. For transitions to labour market programs, there is a positive benefit
elasticity, probably reflecting that higher benefits make it more costly to reject pro-
gram partic ipation.
For the employment hazard, the absolute value of the benefit elasticity in-
creases significantly with age, hence we apparently reject the theoretically founded
prediction, discussed in Section 2, that disincentive effects are stronger for young per-
sons due to the tight wage distributions they face (Narendranathan et al, 1985). We
speculate that our finding at this point is related to the fact that the Public Employ-
ment Service exerts a relatively strong pressure on young unemployed persons to ac-
cept available jobs or program slots, hence they are left with less room for individual
optimisation. The benefit elasticity also increases with spell duration. Again our re-
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sults contradict theoretical predictions as well as previous empirical evidence (Naren-
dranathan and Stewart, 1993). A possible explanation is that liquidity constraints ac-
centuate the role of economic incentives, and that these constraints become more
prevalent as the spells are prolonged.  We do not find any significant changes in the
elasticities over the business cycle (conditioned on spell duration), except that the
elasticity of the loss-of-benefits-hazard with respect to the replacement ratio becomes
smaller (in absolute terms) in good times than in bad times.
The disincentive effects in the employment hazard are stronger for single- than
for married persons, but the income of the spouse does not have a significant impact.
There is weak evidence in favour of a hump-shaped relationship, implying that the
benefit elasticity is larger (in absolute terms) for persons with a low-income spouse
than for persons with either a high-income spouse or a zero-income spouse. The em-
ployment hazard is generally higher for married than for unmarried persons, but lower
if there are children in the family. The latter is particularly the case for females, for
which the predicted employment hazard is more than halved as a result of respons i-
bility for children. This result constitutes fairly strong evidence that opportunity costs
do matter significantly for search behaviour and/or reservation wages. Economic
wealth does not seem affect marginal disincentive effects associated with the re-
placement ratio. It apparently has a positive impact on the level of the employment
hazard and a negative impact on the sickness-disability hazard. This is, however,
likely to reflect correlation with unobserved characteristics rather than causality.
The predicted benefit elasticities based on the suspected non-independent varia-
tion in replacement ratios *( )ir , reported in part III of the table, reveal that neglect of
unobserved heterogeneity may produce a substantial bias in response parameters. In
our case, it seems that the elasticity of the job hazard rate with respect to the replace-
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ment ratio would have been seriously underestimated had we based our inference on
the observed variation in replacement ratios and relied on control variables only to
remove spurious correlation. This may perhaps explain why European evidence so
often has failed to come up with significant disincentive effects at all (see e.g. Hujer
and Schneider, 1989; Groot, 1990; van den Berg, 1990b; Steiner, 1990; Hernæs and
Strøm, 1996).
5.3 Observed and unobserved heterogeneity
There are substantial variations in individuals’ hazard rates. Figure 2 presents estima-
tion results regarding educational attainment and Figure 3 presents the results regard-
ing individual ability (proxied by position in the national education- and experience
specific maximum wage distribution, see Section 3). Both educational attainment and
ability contribute to higher employment hazard rates. There are two possible explana-
tions for that, one demand-side and one supply-side. The demand-side explanation is
that the relatively compressed Norwegian wage distribution makes high-skilled- and
high-ability workers attractive labour from the employers’ point of view (Røed, 1998;
Røed and Nordberg, 2002). The supply side explanation is that the ability- and skill
variables operate as proxies for expected wages (see Section 4). There is no clear
pattern in the way education and ability affects the transitions to sickness and disabil-
ity. For ability, there is weak evidence in favour of a non-monotonic pattern. It may
be noted that high ability implies a relatively high risk of being sanctioned. A likely
explanation is that high-ability workers are more selective, given their relatively
strong labour market performance in the past. High-ability workers also have a rela-
tively high exit rate to labour market programs, indicating an element of positive se-
lection to these programs (our ability measure will typically be unobserved in most
studies).
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Figure 2. Estimated effects of educational attainment, with 95 per cent confidence in-
tervals.
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Figure 3. Estimated effects of ability, with 95 per cent confidence intervals.
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Demographic factors also have a substantial influence on the hazard rates. The coeffi-
cients attached to a male dummy are estimated to 0.18 (0.02) in the transition to em-
ployment and to –0.89 (0.06) in the transition to sickness/disability (there are no sig-
nificant gender effects in the other two transitions). These estimates imply that men
have a transition rate to employment that is around 20 per cent higher, and a transition
rate to sickness/disability that is around 60 per cent lower, than otherwise equal
women. The effect of age is illustrated in Figure 4. All the hazards decline as func-
tions of age. The strong decline in the sickness/disability hazard may appear surpris-
ing. Our interpretation of this result is that the propensity to report sickness during
unemployment spells is higher for younger- than for older persons, both because they
are subject to a stronger pressure towards accepting jobs and because they have a
higher probability of being selected for rehabilitation programs.
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Figure 4. Estimated effects of age, with 95 per cent confidence intervals.
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The estimated distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is described in Table 3. Al-
though it is difficult to interpret the various ‘types’ directly6, it may be of interest to
have a look at the relationship between unobserved heterogeneity in the different tran-
sitions. It turns out that unobserved heterogeneity in transitions to employment, sick-
ness/disability and loss of benefits display a mover-stayer-property, i.e. it is a strong
positive correlation between unobservables regarding these transitions. There is a
negative correlation between unobservables regarding employment transitions and
program participation (the correlation coefficient between 1exp( )iv and 4exp( )iv is
–0.18), indicating that there is negative selection on unobservables to labour market
program in these data.
Table 3
The Estimated Distribution of Unobserved Heterogeneity
(standard errors in parentheses)
Probability
(per cent)
Employment
1iv
Sickness/
disability
2iv
Loss of bene-
fits
3iv
Program par-
ticipation
4iv
Type 1 19.08 -3.98
(0.21)
-7.84
(0.60)
-4.86
(0.29)
-6.03
(0.42)
Type 2 0.89 2.34
(2.22)
0.73
(2.28)
- infinity -6.49
(0.41)
Type 3 15.07 -1.79
(0.17)
-4.56
(0.45)
-5.07
(2.69)
-6.17
(1.59)
Type 4 62.63 -2.84
(0.17)
-6.99
(0.50)
-3.03
(2.24)
-5.21
(0.29)
Type 5 2.32 0.00
(0.60)
-4.05
(1.90)
-3.24
(0.24)
-5.36
(0.27)
                                                
6 Our experience is that different combinations of ‘types’ and probabilities sometimes produce
equally ‘good’ likelihood functions, indicating that there is a fundamental lack of identification of the
unobserved heterogeneity distribution (there are different local maximums with almost the same func-
tion value). However, the moments of these alternative distributions are typically almost identical (they
have very similar Laplace transforms), and the parameters attached to observed variables (including
spell duration) also tend to be the same.
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6 Concluding Remarks
Based on random-assignment-like variation in unemployment benefit replacement
ratios, we have found that the average elasticity of the employment hazard rate with
respect to the replacement ratio was around –0.4 in Norway during the 1993-97 pe-
riod. We have also found that the disincentive effects become stronger as the unem-
ployment spell is prolonged, that they are stronger for older- than for younger people,
and that they stronger for single than for married persons. The disincentive effects are
stable over the business cycle. Economic conditions embedded in family wealth and
spouse income do not affect the benefit elasticity.
We have identified the degree of structural duration dependence in the propen-
sity to find a job, to become sick or disabled, to lose benefits, and to enter into labour
market programs, without reliance on any parametric assumptions about either unob-
served heterogeneity or the distribution of individual durations. We find that there is a
substantial negative duration dependence in the employment hazard, apart from a sig-
nificant rise in the months just prior to benefit exhaustion. There is positive duration
dependence in the sickness/disability hazard. Together, these findings suggest that
discouragement, depreciation of human capital and/or statistical discrimination
against long-term unemployed are significant real-world phenomena. The propensity
to lose benefits (sanctions) and enter into labour market programs also exhibit positive
duration dependence, but these patterns are more governed by administrative proce-
dure than by individual behaviour.
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